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Long-term international trading relationships in exhaustible resources play an important role in the world economy but have received little formal attention.' In particular, a country can benefit from holding strategic resource reserves, but almost nothing in the voluminous literature on exhaustible resources indicates upon what the value of such reserves might depend. This paper studies one rationale for strategic reserves in a simple model that provides a vehicle for discussing the modeling issues that arise in this area and allows a characterization of the optimal reserve policy in a leading special case.
To understand the aspect of the problem, consider, for definiteness, the determination of the best U.S. strategy for dealing with threats by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to interrupt oil supplies. Three separate, possibly conflicting, considerations are potentially relevant. The first, reducing the frequency of embargoes, is of great interest and has not been considered in the literature. This paper also avoids this issue by assuming that embargoes never occur in equilibrium, although embargo threats might still influence the terms of trade. But recent developments in bargaining theory (see for example Crawford or Sobel and Takahashi and the references cited there) might have useful applications to this problem. The second consideration, reducing the cost of embargoes when they occur, has been discussed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Mayer, Sweeney, Tolley and Wilman, and others. These studies take the influence of the home country's actions on the probability of an embargo as exogenous and derive rationales for strategic reserves from this specification.
The third consideration, reducing the cost of embargo threats in the negotiations that determine the terms of trade in oil, is the subject of this paper.2 Even though the U.S. has substantial oil supplies of its own, it derives significant benefits over time from importing or exporting; and because the world oil market is far from competitive, the trading relationship with OPEC generates a large surplus relative to parties' next-best trading alternatives. Further, long-term contracts for the delivery of oil are generally acknowledged to be unenforceable across national boundaries (Dasgupta and Heal and Maskin and Newbery), and might be uneconomic even if they could be enforced. The relationship is therefore naturally modeled as a dynamic bargaining problem in which a sequence of short-term negotiated agreements takes the place of competitive spot markets or a single long-term contract. Both the absence of long-term contracts and the fact that competitive forces are insufficient to determine completely the terms of trade are essential to the explanation of the role of strategic reserves presented here.
In the two-country model of this paper, the gains from trade stem from differences in resource endowments and technologies. Domestic planners control their country's extraction path with the goal of maximizing its gains from the trading relationship over its entire life. Because the ability to withstand embargoes is a natural benchmark from which to measure the gains from trade, it influences the negotiated terms of trade. Strategic reserves can yield real benefits, even when embargoes never occur, by reducing the cost of threatened embargoes in bargaining. If, for example, a relatively oil-poor country exhausts its oil supply too rapidly, its increased dependence on oil-rich countries in the later part of the trading relationship can be expected to lead to unfavorable terms of trade; this should create a motive to delay extraction. An oil-rich country faces the converse problem of how best to exploit its scarce bargaining advantage over the life of the relationship. These problems are interlinked and are resolved simultaneously by countries' equilibrium extraction strategies. We show that, in a leading case, the equilibrium involves the oil-rich country alone extracting for the first part of the relationship, exporting to smooth production in both countries until parity is reached. At that time autarky ensues, with both countries extracting until their stocks are exhausted. Total extraction is typically inefficiently slow. The analysis of this leading case rationalizes intuition and indicates the likely qualitative features of the equilibrium for more general specifications. This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces and motivates the model. The following section shows how to characterize optimal extraction policies and consumption paths in general and solves for them in the leading case where countries have identical technologies differing only in their initial resource endowments. The final section gives the conclusion.
The Model
This section presents the model. It could be extended in several directions, but a "stripped-down" version is presented for ease of exposition. Consider two countries, each with a given, known stock of the resource and perfect knowledge of all other aspects of the environment. Suppose each seeks to maximize the undiscounted integral of consumption from time zero to time T, at which point a cheap backstop technology becomes available to both countries, making the resource uneconomical. Discounting at equal rates could be allowed without significantly altering the results. Extraction is costless and storage above the ground is costly and therefore uneconomical. The planners in each country set extraction rates unilaterally and negotiate an exchange of resource for the consumption good with the planners in the other country at each instant of time, taking extraction rates as given. The amount of compensation, which determines how countries share the gains from trade, is determined by the amount of resource exchanged and by countries' relative "bargaining powers," which are in turn determined by how well each country could survive an embargo for the rest of the time horizon. These assumptions are stated more precisely and discussed further below.
The countries are denoted F and G. They have neoclassical instantaneous production functions fand g; each takes domestic extraction plus or minus imports or exports of the resource as input and yields consumption as output. They should be regarded as indirect production functions that take into account domestic production possibilities as well as opportunities for trade in world markets; this could include trade with small competitive suppliers of the resource. The functions f and g are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with strictly positive first derivatives and strictly negative second derivatives everywhere; in addition, they are assumed to satisfy an Inada condition at the origin, with the limit of the marginal productivity of oil approaching infinity as total oil use approaches zero. These restrictions could be derived from standard assumptions on the underlying production technologies. Countries Because countries seek to maximize consumption, which can be transferred from one country to the other at a one-for-one rate simply by agreeing on a different oil price, bargaining efficiency requires that the marginal productivity of the resource be equalized across countries at each instant. Thus, given our specifications off and g, a unique efficient level of imports for country F exists for any In world resource markets, each country has the right to impose an embargo, partial or total, for as long as it wishes. For this reason, assume that current compensation is determined by countries' ability to withstand an embargo for the rest of the time horizon. This is not the only reasonable specification, but it leads to interesting results. It reflects the great importance of the future relative to the present in the continuous-time model and the fact that it may be significantly easier to commit to a long-term embargo, which can be enforced unilaterally, than to a long-term contract, which cannot.
An alternative specification applies standard bargaining theory to the dynamic-programming value functions whose changes over time measure the long-run payoff gains from current agreements. As it happens, this apparently sensible approach does not yield a sensible model of strategic reserve policy in this model. The reason, which is most conveniently demonstrated in a discrete-time framework, is illuminating.
Let otr denote F's value function at time t, and let Ft similarly denote G's value function. The assumption just adopted rules out any influence of current extraction rates on the outcome of the current bargain except as they influence m[-]; this assumption turns out to be important for the analytical tractability of the model. The strongest justification for this assumption rests on the fact that in a continuous-time model, the present is insignificant when compared with the future, and on the argument that a planner's goal in this sort of situation ought to be the preservation of the trading relationship for the benefits it is expected to yield over time. If this is correct, the current bargain ought to be evaluated as part of the sequence of bargains to which it belongs, and planners should insist only that the gains from trade throughout the sequence are shared appropriately. For example, a bargain need not be rejected because it violates static individual rationality-that is, if its instantaneous current net benefits are negativeprovided that it satisfies intertemporal individual rationality-that is, that it is part of a predictable sequence of bargains that, taken together, are beneficial to the country. While violations of static individual rationality may seem counterintuitive, they are not necessarily incompatible with the rationality of nonmyopic planners who can predict the outcomes of future negotiations. Such planners will not wish to endanger a trading relationship that is beneficial in the long run to obtain additional short-run gains that are of little significance over the long run.
These 
Characterization of Equilibrium and Best Responses
We now proceed to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium choice of extraction paths. Given the assumptions and definitions above, the problems that determine countries' equilibrium strategy choices can be written as 
{g [-m(u't, V't) -V't] + m(u't, v't)h(ut, vt, T -t)}dt subject to VT = 0, v't -0 for all t E [0, T].

Problems (F) and (G) determine a standard differential game.
While explicit characterization of the equilibrium is difficult in general, as with most differential games, equilibrium is easily described in a leading, illuminating special case. Suppose that both countries have the same technology, so that f(-) -g(). This assumption is very strong, essentially implying that countries have identical capital stocks and non-resource market opportunities as well as identical available techniques of production. However, it leads to a solution not otherwise readily obtained, and it seems unlikely to give a distorted view of the qualitative form of
equilibrium in general. With identical technologies, (2) and (3) and the definition of m[u't, v't] imply that m,[u't, v't] -1/2 and m2[u't, V' t] -1/2, since assumptions aboutf and g imply that m[u't, v't] -u't = -m[u't, v't] -v't.
To aid further in the characterization, consider additional assumptions about the compensation function. In particular, suppose the integrands in (F) and (G) are concave in (ut, u't) and (vt, V't), respectively; these secondorder conditions guarantee that the necessary conditions for optimality are sufficient. Also,
m['][hl(-)
+ h2(')] measures the change in compensation associated with an equal increase in stocks. This change increases total supplies without arguably affecting relative bargaining strengths; at least in the symmetric case, such an increase can be expected to reduce (in absolute value) the amount of compensation. Thus, assume that hi () + h2(0) < 0.
This is satisfied, for example, when h(ut, vt, T -t) + { ff'[ut/(T -t)] + g'[vt/(T -t)]}.
The following result can now be established. Given the assumption on hi(') + h2('), (5) and (6) can be satisfied simultaneously if and only if u't = v' constant. Clearly, u't v't. To see that they must be constant, note that when u't = v't, (5) reduces to (7) f'(-u't) + h(ut, vt, T -t) constant.
Arguments below (without using the constancy of u't and v't) imply that ut = vt as well.
Further, with identical technologies, intertemporal individual rationality clearly requires that h(u, u, T -t) -f'[u/(T -t)]
g'[u/(T -t)]. Otherwise, when stocks are nearly equal, one country could do better by switching to autarky. This reduces (7) to
(8) f'(-u't) + f'[ut/(T -t)] t constant.
A straightforward argument, using the feasibility conditions on u([O, T]), shows that (8) has exactly one economically relevant solution, -u't = ut/(T -t), which establishes the claim. The assumptions also ensure that an equilibrium involves the country with more stock extracting until stocks are equalized. To see this, notice that the Inada conditions (and the fact that storage above the ground is uneconomical) guarantee that some country is extracting at each instant. If both countries are extracting at time zero and initial stocks are unequal, then at some time strictly before T one country stops extracting. Otherwise, since u't = v't, both stocks could not be exhausted at time T. However, the country that first stops extracting can improve its welfare by delaying its extraction. Essentially, this happens because hi(') + h2(') < 0 guarantees that the cost of imports could be reduced by postponing some extraction until after an interval of equal depletion of resources. A similar argument shows that no country would choose to exhaust its stock before the other country. Hence, attention can be restricted to strategies that involve the resource-rich country extracting until its excess reserve is depleted and then both countries extracting at the same constant rate.
For The inequality follows from integrating both sides from 0 to T, breaking the last two terms on the right into integrals from 0 to S and from S to T, and integrating the terms involving H3 by parts.
u([O, T]; S*) is the best-response extraction path to v([O, T]; S*). This establishes the result.
Several remarks are in order. First, from (12), aggregate extraction is continuous at S* and hence for all t. Second, when the two countries have identical, neoclassical technologies, intertemporally efficient paths are characterized by a constant rate of aggregate production. Since the first part of the resource-rich country's extraction path will not in general be flat in equilibrium, equilibrium production will be intertemporally inefficient. Plausible assumptions about the compensation function ensure that equilibrium extraction is less than the efficient rate until stocks are exhausted. Thus, countries delay extraction in order to obtain bargaining advantages in the future.
Note that the solution paths are intertemporally consistent by construction. That is, a country whose expectations about the other country's actions are realized while carrying out the initial part of an equilibrium path will not wish to depart from the remainder of the path.
Finally, consider equilibrium and best-response extraction paths in more detail. Recall that intertemporal individual rationality implies that in the identical-technologies case, h(u, u, T -t) f' [u/(T -t)]; that is, when stocks are equal, the price of the resource is equal to its marginal productivity at u/(T -t), the rate at which the stock will be extracted under autarky. In general, the arguments above suggest that when technologies are identical, h(u, v, T -t) should be between f'[u/(T -t)] and f'[v/(T -t)]-exactly where depends upon a specification of bargaining power. An increase in a country's stock has two, possibly opposing, influences on compensation. First, because increased stock means increased total supply, the increase should tend to push prices down. On the other hand, the bargaining outcome should be influenced in favor of the country with increased stocks. If v < u, then an increase in v will lower prices because both effects move in the same direction. On the other hand, an increase in u has an ambiguous effect on h(.). Similarly, since increasing t with u and v held constant both increases supply relative to the remaining time and increases the advantage of the resource-rich country, such a change has an ambiguous effect on h. Now suppose that one country, say F, is extracting at a constant rate, -u', over some interval. Consider the other country's best response. The Euler equation (6) . That is, if the net effect of not extracting is to increase the price paid to the exporting country so that h3 < 0, G extracts at an increasing rate until stocks are equalized. Thus, the equilibrium of the differential game leads to an aggregate extraction path that is slower than the intertemporally efficient rate. (Recall that the aggregate extraction rate is continuous in equilibrium.) Alternatively, if the price reduction caused by not extracting dominates the increased bargaining advantage, the equilibrium extraction path, in aggregate, is faster than the efficient rate. In this unlikely case, the resource-rich country gets the most benefit from its greater stock by using it quickly.
To get a definite characterization of the best-response functions to a totally flat extraction strategy, make the additional assumption that h(u, v, If v• < i-0, earlier arguments suggest that k2(0) < 0 because increasing the resource-poor country's stock should reduce the price it must pay to import. Consequently, (19) implies that the best response of the resourcepoor country to a constant extraction path for the resource-rich country is to extract at an increasing rate, equalizing stock only at T. Alternatively, if 3o > ui, (19) characterizes the resource-rich country's best response to a constant rate of extraction by the resourcepoor country. In this case, k2(-) > 0 implies v" < 0; this is possible if the increased bargaining strength derived from increasing the resource-rich country's stock outweighs the effect that increasing supply has on compensation. However, a decreasing rate of extraction is possible here.
T -t) k[u/(T -t), v/(T -t)]. Then if u't is constant for all t E [0, T], (18) becomes
Conclusion
This paper has considered the determination of optimal strategic resource reserve policy in a simple model where delaying extraction enhances a country's bargaining power by making it less vulnerable to embargo threats. The rationale for holding strategic reserves rests on two stylized facts of world markets for exhaustible resources, particularly oil: that competitive forces are typically too weak to eliminate all other influences on the negotiated price of oil and that trading relationships cannot be organized by long-term contracts because they are unenforceable across national boundaries.
In a simple, two-country model reflecting these features, results show how to characterize countries' optimal extraction paths. In a leading special case, these paths take a strikingly simple, "bang-bang" form, in which only the resource-rich country extracts, exporting to smooth production in both countries until stocks are equalized, at which point autarky ensues. Total extraction is typically slower than the efficient path that would result if countries could organize their trading relationship by a single long-term contract. Although the assumptions that underlie this characterization-identical technologies, in particular-are very strong, the qualitative features of equilibrium in more general specidentified here. The robustness of the results is an interesting question, particularly with respect to the commitment assumption implicit in the open-loop equilibrium and to the assumption that trade, but not extraction policies, is negotiated.
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